REA
Reverse engineer anything from your terminal or agent with one CLI and MCP server.
MOmorluto/rea111k近 7 天新增 104,453 个 star
Hosted NeuroDock — stateless communication and planning tools over OAuth-secured Streamable HTTP.
The combined remote MCP server for NeuroDock (ADR 0008 / ADR 0009, Phase 2).
It composes the three stateless NeuroDock servers into a single Streamable HTTP endpoint and exposes only the remote-safe tools:
| Source server | Tools exposed remotely |
|---|---|
mcp-translation | translate_incoming, check_tone, rewrite_outgoing, brief_meeting |
mcp-guardrail | check_rumination, check_hyperfocus, check_sycophancy |
mcp-task-fractionator | decompose only |
The four cognitive-graph tools (recall_entity, record_fact,
recall_decisions, weekly_rollup) are also exposed, but gated: they require
a signed-in account that has explicitly enabled storage. Two modes coexist; a
user is in exactly one at a time:
| Tool | Mode | What it does |
|---|---|---|
enable_hosted_storage | hosted | NeuroDock provisions a private per-user Turso database and stores facts there. Returns the consent disclosure. |
connect_byos_storage | byos | You point at your own libSQL/Turso database; NeuroDock stores only the connection pointer. |
disable_and_erase_storage | → none | Hosted: destroys your Turso database. BYOS: clears the stored connection (your DB untouched). Either way the preference/consent is cleared. |
disconnect_storage | → none | BYOS-only alias: clears the connection + preference. (Use disable_and_erase_storage to erase hosted.) |
storage_status | — | Reports your mode (hosted | byos | none). |
The mode is selected per user from their recorded storage preference; a
single combined resolver routes each cognitive-graph call to the hosted or BYOS
backing. The privacy boundary is unchanged from Phase D: an anonymous / no-token
caller gets STORAGE_NOT_AVAILABLE and nothing is stored, read, or
provisioned; a signed-in but not-enabled caller gets STORAGE_NOT_CONNECTED.
Hosted requires a provisioned Turso org/group/token. Set
NEURODOCK_TURSO_PLATFORM_TOKEN+NEURODOCK_TURSO_ORG(+ optionalNEURODOCK_TURSO_GROUP, defaultdefault, which must already exist in the org). Without themenable_hosted_storageis refused and only BYOS is offered.
Encryption-key custody (honest limitation). Both the BYOS auth token and the hosted Turso DB token are encrypted at rest with a single operator-wide
NEURODOCK_STATE_MASTER_KEY. That means NeuroDock can technically decrypt a stored token. This is the documented ADR 0010 open question; per-user / envelope keys (so the operator cannot unilaterally read a user's DB token) are a tracked follow-up. The on-disk format is unchanged either way, so a future scheme can re-wrap without a data migration.
Chronometric session state, the user profile (neurotype data), and
task-fractionator's next_one (reads the local graph) are never mounted. They
hold local state and stay strictly on the local stdio install. The boundary is
enforced in code and pinned by tests against REMOTE_TOOL_NAMES.
This is a deploy artifact, not a published package — it is not uploaded to PyPI (the local install path via
@neurodock/cliis unchanged). Local-only tools remain available exactly as before through the stdio servers.
The remote server exposes tools, not skills. Skills are markdown the
client reads locally, so the remote endpoint never delivers them. Hosted/remote
users get the per-neurotype skills the same way local users do: install the
Claude Code marketplace plugin (which bundles them) or run
neurodock install-skills from @neurodock/cli, which copies each skill into
~/.claude/skills/neurodock-<name>/SKILL.md for Claude Code / Claude Desktop.
See packages/skills/README.md for the delivery paths.
# from the repo root
uv run --package neurodock-remote neurodock-remote
# serves http://127.0.0.1:8000/mcp (+ /health)
Inspect it with the MCP Inspector pointed at http://127.0.0.1:8000/mcp.
| Env var | Default | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
NEURODOCK_HTTP_HOST | 127.0.0.1 | Bind host (0.0.0.0 in the container). |
NEURODOCK_HTTP_PORT | 8000 | Bind port. |
NEURODOCK_AUTH_PROVIDER | none | none | clerk | workos | jwt. The hosted deploy uses clerk. |
NEURODOCK_PUBLIC_URL | — | Public base URL, e.g. https://mcp.neurodock.org (required by clerk/workos/jwt). |
NEURODOCK_OAUTH_REQUIRED_SCOPES | — | Optional, comma-separated. |
NEURODOCK_CLERK_DOMAIN | — | clerk: your Clerk instance domain (e.g. your-app.clerk.accounts.dev). |
NEURODOCK_CLERK_CLIENT_ID | — | clerk: OAuth application client ID. |
NEURODOCK_CLERK_CLIENT_SECRET | — | clerk: OAuth client secret (set as a secret, not plaintext). |
NEURODOCK_CLERK_SECRET_KEY | — | Storage (ADR 0010 C/D): Clerk Backend API key; persists the per-user storage pointer. |
NEURODOCK_STATE_MASTER_KEY | — | Storage (ADR 0010 C/D): master key that encrypts the BYOS/hosted DB token at rest. |
NEURODOCK_TURSO_PLATFORM_TOKEN | — | Hosted (ADR 0010 C): Turso Platform API token; provisions/destroys per-user databases. |
NEURODOCK_TURSO_ORG | — | Hosted (ADR 0010 C): Turso organization slug the hosted databases are created in. |
NEURODOCK_TURSO_GROUP | default | Hosted (ADR 0010 C): Turso group the hosted databases are created in (must exist). |
NEURODOCK_GRAPH_DISABLE_EMBEDDINGS | 1 (image) | Storage: keeps the hosted graph lean (no fastembed). Set in the Dockerfile. |
NEURODOCK_AUTHKIT_DOMAIN | — | workos: your AuthKit domain. |
NEURODOCK_OAUTH_ISSUER / _JWKS_URI / _AUDIENCE | — | jwt: generic OIDC resource-server config. |
⚠️ Auth is required before public exposure. With
NEURODOCK_AUTH_PROVIDERunset the server runs unauthenticated and logs a loud warning — that mode is for localhost/integration testing only (ADR 0009 §3). The identity provider is a configuration choice, not a code change; FastMCP ships first-class Clerk, WorkOS AuthKit, and Auth0 providers plus the generic JWT verifier wired here.
# build from the repo root (the Dockerfile uses root-relative COPY paths)
docker build -f packages/remote/Dockerfile -t neurodock-remote .
docker run --rm -p 8000:8000 \
-e NEURODOCK_AUTH_PROVIDER=clerk \
-e NEURODOCK_CLERK_DOMAIN=your-app.clerk.accounts.dev \
-e NEURODOCK_CLERK_CLIENT_ID=xxxx \
-e NEURODOCK_CLERK_CLIENT_SECRET=yyyy \
-e NEURODOCK_PUBLIC_URL=https://mcp.neurodock.org \
neurodock-remote
The chosen host (ADR 0009). The Python container runs on Cloudflare Containers,
fronted by a thin Worker (worker/index.ts) that owns the
mcp.neurodock.org custom domain. Config: wrangler.jsonc.
Requires a Workers Paid plan — Containers are not on the free tier. The Worker + container are deploy tooling only; this directory is intentionally not a pnpm-workspace member, so install/deploy happen here directly.
Create a Clerk OAuth application and note the instance domain + client ID/secret.
Fill vars in wrangler.jsonc (NEURODOCK_CLERK_DOMAIN,
NEURODOCK_CLERK_CLIENT_ID) — these are non-secret.
From this directory (packages/remote/):
npm install
npx wrangler secret put NEURODOCK_CLERK_CLIENT_SECRET # paste the secret
# Optional — enable the opt-in memory tools (ADR 0010 C/D). Without the next
# two the tools stay visible but un-backed (sign-in/enable refusal):
npx wrangler secret put NEURODOCK_CLERK_SECRET_KEY # Clerk Backend API key
npx wrangler secret put NEURODOCK_STATE_MASTER_KEY # token-encryption master key
# Optional — enable NeuroDock-hosted storage (ADR 0010 C). Also set
# NEURODOCK_TURSO_ORG (and NEURODOCK_TURSO_GROUP) in wrangler.jsonc `vars`.
# Without the token + org, enable_hosted_storage is refused; BYOS still works:
npx wrangler secret put NEURODOCK_TURSO_PLATFORM_TOKEN # Turso Platform API token
npx wrangler deploy # builds ../Dockerfile, pushes, deploys
wrangler deploy builds the image (context ../../ = repo root), provisions
the mcp.neurodock.org DNS + TLS automatically (the custom_domain route), and
starts the container behind the Worker.
Verify: https://mcp.neurodock.org/health → 200, then add
https://mcp.neurodock.org/mcp as a custom connector in Claude and complete the
Clerk OAuth round-trip.
See ADR 0009 for the transport, scope, auth, and hosting decisions.
Status: this Cloudflare deploy config is a verified-by-docs scaffold; it has not yet been run through
wrangler deploy. Treat the first deploy as the validation step.
Reverse engineer anything from your terminal or agent with one CLI and MCP server.
MOmorluto/rea111k近 7 天新增 104,453 个 star
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