Workspace access

What workspaceAccess exposes to the sandbox, how a role-required sandbox caps it, and how skills are mirrored into the sandbox workspace.

Workspace access

agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceAccess controls what the sandbox can see:

Value	Behavior
none (default)	Tools can read and write an isolated sandbox workspace under ~/.openclaw/sandboxes; the agent workspace is not exposed.
ro	Mounts the agent workspace read-only at /agent (disables write/edit/apply_patch).
rw	Mounts the agent workspace read/write at /workspace.

For a role-required sandbox, OpenClaw caps configured rw workspace access at ro and logs an agent/sandbox warning. The guest keeps a separate sandbox workspace, while the shared agent workspace is available only as a read-only mount. This prevents guests from sharing the writable agent workspace; none and ro remain unchanged. Sessions without a role-required sandbox retain their configured workspace access.

Managed project workspaces

A sandboxed session with a session-owned managed worktree uses a private Git checkout on Docker and Podman. A registered project may be outside the agent's configured workspace when it is selected with worktree: true. This authorizes source preparation, not direct access to that host directory. Arbitrary external cwd values and direct project bindings remain restricted.

Visible child sessions keep their managed worktree as the sandbox workspace on later turns, including sessions created before an update.

The private checkout contains the selected source commit, not the host's shared Git configuration, credential helpers, other branches, or ignored files selected by .worktreeinclude. Guest preparation does not run the repository's host setup script. Canonical source-only checkout, snapshot, and restore operations use a command-scoped trusted Git configuration view, so repository, worktree, global, and included filter programs cannot execute on the Gateway—even if configuration changes while preparation is waiting. Private-checkout packing uses that same configuration boundary and does not lazily fetch missing Git objects. If the source is incomplete, fetch its objects through the trusted host workflow and retry preparation. Git still owns the registered worktree, index, HEAD, and snapshot refs; ordinary trusted maintainer checkouts are unchanged. The guest’s Git commands operate on private metadata. Initial non-ignored source paths are admitted before guest execution and retained in the projection binding. Later host-created paths enter an existing projection only after the host stages them in the canonical Git index (git add); changing an ignore rule alone does not admit host files, including newly provisioned files. Existing admitted source edits and guest-created files continue to reconcile, including guest-created ignored files. Source filenames must be valid UTF-8; rename invalid Git paths before retrying preparation. Publication uses the same admission boundary. Canonical recovery snapshots retain host data under their existing rules, but restoration does not admit that data to the guest. Use the session's managed GitHub publication action to publish accepted changes; host credentials are not copied into the sandbox. The runtime-owned .openclaw/sandbox-skills subtree is excluded from workspace reconciliation and publication; other project content under .openclaw is retained. Its empty mount targets are created by the host workspace owner before container allocation, while the skill mounts remain read-only. This also keeps normal retention cleanup independent of container user-namespace ownership.

The private checkout is writable with none or rw workspace access; explicit ro remains read-only. This does not make the shared agent workspace writable. Other sandbox backends cannot use this local managed-project projection and fail with an explanation rather than falling back to host execution.

The managed worktree remains the canonical workspace for files, snapshots, and publication. OpenClaw pauses the exact execution and browser runtimes that mount this checkout while capturing or applying changes, records pending results and rollback journals in SQLite, and resumes only after settlement. Captured workspace authority is checked again after filesystem and engine preparation, immediately before filesystem commands, container creation/start/setup, and late browser restarts. Closing the owner during preparation prevents those effects rather than rejecting only afterward. Conflicts preserve both versions and block further settlement until resolved. A retry or restart recovers the same pending result. Archive, reset, and deletion settle changes before retiring their runtimes; projection cleanup follows the existing managed-worktree snapshot retention. Accepted guest-created ignored files (including symlinks) and empty directories survive archive and restore through the same pending-result recovery owner. This does not force ignored paths into Git publication or import unrelated ignored host files. Older versions leave that recovery receipt intact but do not apply it; return to a supporting version before continuing guest work.

With the OpenShell backend, mirror mode still uses the local workspace as the canonical source between exec turns, and remote mode uses the remote OpenShell workspace as canonical after the initial seed. The same access rules apply: none permits private workspace writes, while ro disables writes.

Inbound media is copied into the active sandbox workspace (media/inbound/*).